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Abstract: This study examines the extent to which the modular approach to anti-
corruption enforcement has taken hold in six South American countries. We describe 
the process of enforcing anti-corruption law, in functional terms, and why modular 
design might be an optimal way of reconciling the advantages and disadvantages of 
coordination among institutions. We then identify a number of factors that might 
influence the design of the anti-corruption institutions adopted in any given country. 
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Next we examine whether and to what extent modular institutional design has been 
implemented in anti-corruption enforcement in six South American countries: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru. For each country we 
describe the institutions responsible for enforcing anti-corruption law, the coordination 
mechanisms they have developed, and factors that have hampered the development of 
those mechanisms. Our results show that the same functions or combinations of 
functions are often performed by different institutions in different countries. In the area 
of anti-corruption law enforcement at least, we are now convinced that a cross-country 
analysis limited either to a particular area of law, say civil, criminal or administrative 
law, or to a particular set of institutions, such as the courts and police, carries a serious 
risk of being misleading. This risk may be present in other areas of law enforcement. 
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 Is there a single best way to regulate political corruption? There is a strong 
consensus around the idea that an anti-corruption regime should include legal 
prohibitions on bribery, embezzlement and money laundering in relation to public 
officials.
1
 There is no equivalent consensus around how to organize enforcement of 
those prohibitions. Inspired by the Brazilian experience, an emerging view favors 
dividing responsibility for enforcement among multiple institutions that are able, but 
not required, to coordinate their activities. We refer to this as the “modular” approach 
to anti-corruption enforcement. The proposal that other countries – and especially other 
developing countries—should adopt this model is appealing because it avoids 
traditional concerns about borrowing formal legal arrangements from the Global North 
that might function very differently in the context of the Global South. Accordingly, 
we examine the extent to which the modularapproach to anti-corruption enforcement 
has taken hold in six South American countries. Our findings suggest that its viability 
is context-specific, meaning that whether the model has been implemented in any 
given country is explained by a range of political, intellectual and institutional factors. 
 
At one time, the conventional wisdom was that responsibility for virtually all 
aspects of anti-corruption enforcement should be concentrated in a single institution. 
The inspiration was Hong Kong’s famously successful Independent Commission 
against Corruption (ICAC), which has exclusive responsibility for investigation of 
bribery and related offences. The integrated model of enforcement is perceived to have 
had limited success.
2
 Integrated anti-corruption agencies are said to be prone to 
                                                 
1
 UNCAC has 170 parties, including every country in the Western hemisphere, and so its text seems like 
a reasonable proxy for an international consensus on the legal definition of corruption. UNCAC does not 
define the term “corruption” explicitly but it does refer to a variety of activities which by implication are 
to be regarded as forms of corruption. UNCAC requires its parties to criminalize bribery and 
misappropriation of funds in relation to public officials as well as laundering of the proceedings of those 
activities (Articles 15-17, 23). The parties to UNCAC are also asked to “consider” criminalizing bribery 
and embezzlement in the private sector, trading in influence, abuse of functions, illicit enrichment, and 
concealment in relation to public or private officials (Articles 18-22, 24). On the scope and limits of the 
international consensus on how to define corruption see Twining 2005. 
2
 Meagher 2004; Johnsøn et al 2011. 




political influence, have difficulty attracting sufficient human and financial resources, 




A new paradigm is emerging. In some countries, multiple institutions are 
responsible for investigating corruption. Brazil offers a good example of this kind of 
institutional multiplicity. There, at least five distinct institutions, including the police, 
the public prosecutor, ad hoc legislative committees and various auditing bodies, have 
the authority to investigate corruption offences. In one famous case, allegations of 
corruption in the construction of a courthouse led to an investigation by an auditing 
body, the establishment of an ad hoc parliamentary commitee, a Senate decision to 
expel one of its members, civil and criminal proceedings, and interventions in civil 
proceedings in Switzerland and the United States.
4
 The Brazilian anti-corruption 
institutions often operate independently, but on several occasions they have combined 
forces quite effectively to pursue specific enforcement actions as well as to formulate 
and implement broader enforcement strategies. The structure of this “web of 
accountability” has been credited with inducing significant improvements in the 




Proponents of the Brazilian model celebrate the multiplicity of institutions involved 
in anti-corruption enforcement as a way of compensating for the shortcomings of 
individual institutions and inducing healthy competition.
6
 They are especially 
optimistic about the possibility that reliance on multiple enforcement institutions will 
limit the ability of self-interested officials to use their influence to undermine the 
overall anti-corruption effort. At the same time, proponents of the new model 
encourage the development of mechanisms that permit, but do not require, 
enforcement institutions to work together to pursue common goals. The result is what 
we call a “modular” institutional design, in which multiple functionally 
interchangeable institutions can either coordinate or operate independently as 
appropriate. In principle, the option of coordination should mitigate the familiar risks 
associated with dividing functions among multiple enforcement institutions, namely, 
                                                 
3
 Meagher 2004, Doig et al 2007. 
4
 See Davis, Jorge and Machado forthcoming and Machado and Ferreira 2014. 
5
 Praça and Taylor 2014. 
6
 Prado and Carson 2014, Power and Taylor 2011, Praça and Taylor 2014.  




conflict, duplication of effort, and failure to capture the benefits of specialization. At 
the same time, the possibility of independent action guards against capture and 
preserves the benefits of institutional competition. 
 
Prado and Carson claim that the Brazilian approach to anticorruption enforcement 
(which they refer to as a combination of “institutional multiplicity” and “institutional 
malleability”) can be implemented in other developing countries.
7
 They acknowledge 
the reasons to be skeptical that transplanted legal institutions will perform in the same 
way when transplanted from one context to another.
8
  Prado and Carson argue that 
their proposal transcends these concerns because it offers a meta-principle that is 
compatible with a variety of specific institutional arrangements and can be 
implemented in many different environments.
9
 The present study responds to their call 
for cross-country research on the topic by exploring the viability of modular 
anticorruption enforcement in five of Brazil’s neighboring countries. 
 
 In the next section we describe the process of enforcing anti-corruption law, in 
functional terms, and why modular design might be an optimal way of reconciling the 
advantages and disadvantages of coordinationamong institutions. We then identify a 
number of factors that might influence the design of the anti-corruption institutions 
adopted in any given country. Next we examine whether and to what extent modular 
institutional design has been implemented in anti-corruption enforcement in six South 
American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru. All of 
these countries face similar external pressures to develop coordinated legal responses 
to corruption. At the same time, the countries vary in terms of economic, social, 
political and institutional characteristics that might plausibly bear upon the 
performance of modular enforcement. For each country we describe the institutions 
responsible for enforcing anti-corruption law, the coordination mechanisms they have 
developed, and factors that have hampered the development of those mechanisms. Our 
analyses are based on separate studies for each country that involved documentary 
research as well as 33 in-depth interviews and dozens of informal conversations with 
                                                 
7
 Prado and Carson 2014: 22-25. 
8
 Davis 2010; Nelken 2011, chapter 5. 
9
 On the potential value of meta-principles in understanding the relationship between law and 
development see Davis and Prado 2014: 216. 




high and medium ranked public officials and law enforcement authorities in each 
country. Rather than focusing on a single anti-corruption institution, the analysis aims 
to cover all of the institutions involved in enforcing anticorruption norms.
10
  
2. Cooperation in enforcement of anticorruption law   
2.1. The enforcement process 
Defined in functional terms, enforcement of anti-corruption law, like other 
forms of law enforcement, is a process that involves several distinct activities:  
monitoring, investigation, adjudication (which includes prosecution, defense and 
decisionmaking), imposition of sanctions, and publicity.
11 
These activities represent 
phases of a single process in the sense that the outputs generated in earlier phases, such 




Monitoring and investigation 
A critical part of the enforcement process is collection of data. It is common to 
distinguish two kinds of data collection: monitoring and investigation. The distinction 
begins with the objectives. Monitoring is designed to collect data on legitimate activity 
as well as misconduct,
13
 while investigation is aimed exclusively at uncovering 
misconduct. Monitoring typically involves capturing readily available information 
about large numbers of transactions. It can be accomplished through audits, 
inspections, reporting requirements, disclosure obligations, or analysis of publicly 
                                                 
10
 The idea of covering multiple institutions across several branches of government that enforce multiple 
legal norms using a variety of types of legal proceedings may be unusual in comparative law but is 
accepted as best practice in cross-country studies of anticorruption institutions. See, Pope 2000, 
Mainwaring 2003, Taylor and Buranelli 2007. 
11
 Taylor and Buranelli 2007, Power and Taylor 2011: 13 and Carson and Prado 2014 identify the phases 
of the accountability process as “oversight, investigation and punishment”. See also OECD 2008. We 
have modified Taylor and Buranelli’s scheme by adding the concept of publicity of enforcement and  
dividing the category of “punishment” into two: adjudication and  implementation of sanctions. This last 
move has a number of analytical and practical benefits, including the possibility of shedding light on the 
process by which the imposed sanction is executed and monitored, a process which is frequently 
neglected by legal institutions, policy makers and scholars. Our definition of adjudication combines two 
decisions that are distinguished by Klaus Gunther (2002), namely,  the decision which affirms that an 
actor has violated a norm and the decision which, focusing on a different set of elements (economic 
capacity, amount of harm, etc.) determines the appropriate sanction/remedy to impose.. 
12
 Power and Taylor 2011: 13-14. 
13
 International anticorruption instruments describe monitoring activities as “preventative measures” 
(e.g., UNCAC, Chapter II, arts. 8.5; 14). While this paper exclusively focuses on enforcement, we 
decided to include forms of monitoring that serve as direct sources of information for investigations of 
corruption.  




available information. The resulting data can be stored and analyzed in either physical 
or electronic form –with further practical implications for coordination. Investigation, 
by contrast, typically involves more in-depth analysis of a smaller number of incidents 
of suspected wrongdoing. The concepts overlap and the labels are not necessarily 
applied consistently. Monitoring can be focused in areas where misconduct is believed 
to be highly likely and wide-ranging fishing expeditions can be labeled investigations. 
 
Both monitoring and investigation can be conducted by bodies that are either 
internal or external to the target. Information gathered through monitoringis often used 
in other steps in the enforcement process, i.e. investigation, adjudication, sanctioning, 
or publicity. It may also be provided to the public body being monitored or transferred 
from one agency to another, either directly or by being made available to the general 
public. This may involve either publicizing information or transferring it to another 
enforcement agency. The information produced through monitoring or investigation 
can also be compiled into reports that are either made public or provided to the public 
body being monitored. 
 
Monitoring plays a prominent role in anticorruption enforcement. In particular, 
international anti-corruption conventions (as well as other instruments) strongly 
encourage states to establish two types of monitoring mechanisms: 
 
1) an asset disclosure system for public officials, through which public servants, 
usually on an annual basis, make sworn declarations detailing their own and 
their close families’ patrimony and business interests. These systems, on the 
one hand, prevent potential conflicts of interests and, on the other, monitor 
changes in wealth.  
 
2) a system forfinancial institutions and other gatekeepers, in both the public and 
private sector, to report about large cash transactions, suspicious transactions 
and cross-border movements of currency to a centralized financial
 
intelligence 
unit (FIU) with a view to identifying efforts to launder proceeds of corruption.  
 
The data gathered by these kinds of monitoring sometimes trigger investigations. 
For example, findings of unjustified increases may trigger criminal or administrative 




investigations for illicit enrichment.  Similarly, an FIU might confirm a suspicious 
transaction report and pass it on to a prosecutor for further investigation. Anti-
corruption investigations can also be triggered by information from other sources, such 
as tips from insiders or reports published by investigative journalists. Some 
investigations have narrow aims, such as specific public officials or transactions. 
Others aim at entire government projects, programs or departments.  
Adjudication 
We define adjudication as the production of an authoritative determination of 
whether a specific actor has violated a specific norm and of what legal sanctions, if 
any, ought to be imposed. The process of adjudication can vary significantly across as 
well as within countries, especially when civil, criminal and administrative 
proceedings are compared. In the classic adversarial model the process of adjudication 
involves three actors: the defendant, a plaintiff or prosecutor, and an independent 
tribunal (which may comprise a combination of professionals and laypeople). The 
plaintiff or prosecutor initiates the proceedings by alleging that the defendant has 
violated one or more legal norms. The tribunal makes the legal determination but is 
otherwise passive, leaving it to the parties to initiate proceedings and gather evidence. 
By contrast, in the inquisitorial model the members of the tribunal may initiate 
proceedings and gather evidence independently of the parties.
14
   
 
In South America, civil proceedings generally follow the adversarial model, 
although in many countries they are more inquisitorial than in common law 
jurisdictions. In the criminal realm, for centuries the inquisitorial approach was 
dominant but at the end of the twentieth century a wave of criminal procedure reform 
swept the region. In the course of those reforms all of the countries in our study 
adopted more adversarial systems and, with the exception of Argentina,
15
 established a 
strict separation between prosecution and adjudication.
16
 Around the same time, other 
                                                 
14
 For more on these ideal types see Damaska 1973. For other conceptions of the adversarial/inquisitorial 
distinction see Langer 2014. 
15
 Under Argentina’s Federal Criminal Procedure Code the juez de instrucción is in charge of the 
investigative phase of acriminal case (art. 26), although he/she can delegate such responsibility to the 
prosecutor (article 196).  
16
 Brazil is considered to have adopted a “mixed” model as judges remain competent to require 
documents such as a “previous convictions sheet”, require the participation of witness (“condução 
 




reforms allowed victims of crime to become parties to criminal proceedings as criminal 
plaintiffs (“querellantes” and “assistentes de acusação”, in Brazil).
17
 Argentina has 
gone even further in the direction of allowing multiple prosecutors. Argentine law 
permits anticorruption agencies such as the Anticorruption Office or the FIU to 
exercise querellante’s rights. Administrative proceedings in the region adopt a variety 
of models; in some cases the proceedings are largely inquisitorial, while in other cases 
they are more adversarial, with prosecution and adjudication being performed by 
different divisions within the same agency. 
Imposition of sanctions  
When adjudication results in a determination that legal sanctions ought to be 
imposed, additional steps have to be taken to implement the sanctions. The nature of 
those steps and the actors responsible for undertaking them will depend on the 
sanctions selected. For natural persons the classic sanctions are incarceration and 
economic sanctions such as fines, penalties, damages or forfeiture. In the case of 
incarceration, someone has to apprehend individuals, provide a means of restricting 
their liberty and protecting their health, safety and other individual rights while they 
are incarcerated. In the case of economic sanctions the typical steps in the process are 
seizing or otherwise asserting control over property in which the defendant has an 
interest, selling the property, and distributing the proceeds in some fashion. This can 
all be quite complicated when the defendant has interests in assets located in multiple 
jurisdictions, other parties hold interests in the assets, or the proceeds are to be 
distributed among multiple claimants (such as victims of crime or law enforcement 
agencies that assisted in the enforcement process).  Participants in this stage of the 
enforcement process may enjoy considerable amounts of discretion over how to 
perform their responsibilities. 
 
In the context of anti-corruption proceedings, in some jurisdictions the classic 
repertoire of sanctions has been expanded to include loss of various legal privileges. 
                                                                                                                                             
coercitiva”) and even “control the content of the technical defense, avoiding merely formal reactions” 
(Ataíde 2010, 381).  
17
 Argentina, Criminal Procedural Code, art. 82; Bolivia, Criminal Procedural Code, art. 78; Peru, 
Criminal Procedural Code, art. 107; Paraguay, Criminal Procedural Code, art. 69; Colombia, Criminal 
Procedural Code, art. 32; Brazil, Criminal Procedure Code, art. 268. 




These types of sanctions include denial of the right to enter, remain or do business in a 
particular country, bars on entering into contracts with certain government agencies or 
bars on holding public office. These kinds of sanctions may or may not be pronounced 
in the same adjudicative process as other sanctions. 
Publicity of enforcement 
Enforcement agencies typically disseminate at least some information about their 
activities. The format and timing of disclosure can vary considerably, ranging from 
prompt online publication of individual case files to annual reports containing 
summary statistics. Dissemination of information about enforcement activity is an 
important step in the enforcement process, for at least three reasons.  First, to the extent 
that offenders care about their reputations, publicity of enforcement operates as a form 
of punishment. Second, information about past enforcement activity influences the 
extent to which actors are deterred from offending in the future by providing a basis 
for their predictions about future enforcement practices. Third, as we shall see, sharing 
of information helps enforcement agencies to coordinate their activities.  
 
2.2. Enforcement strategies  
At every step in the enforcement process agencies have decisions to make – which 
activities to monitor, which cases to investigate, what sanctions to impose, where to 
pursue collection efforts, how to distribute the proceeds of collection, etc.  An agency’s 
enforcement strategy for a given period comprises the entire set of enforcement 




 Enforcement strategies sometimes are chosen consciously to achieve 
objectives. For instance, agencies may rank enforcement strategies according to which 
they achieve objectives such as retribution, prevention (which includes both deterrence 
and incapacitation) or compensation. Agencies’ objectives may also include 
minimizing the organizational costs of enforcement, especially when they are given a 
limited budget. Some of the relevant costs will be economic – monitoring, 
                                                 
18
 Enforcement agencies that are legally required to pursue all cases that come to their attention may 
resist being characterized as decision-makers. For our purposes the decision to pursue all possible cases 
is simply one of several possible decisions. 




investigating, adjudicating and sanctioning misconduct can be costly, in terms of both 
human and financial resources. At the same time, the proceeds of economic sanctions 
that result from the implementation of certain enforcement strategies may offset their 
costs (although if those proceeds are remitted to the national treasury they will not 
directly benefit the agency). Agencies’ objectives may be dictated by law. 
Alternatively, they may be shaped by cultural norms or various sorts of incentives 
offered by other agencies. These kinds of objectives can also be revised over time 
through formal or informal decision-making processes. 
 
 An agency’s enforcement strategy need not reflect a coherent set of 
organizational objectives. Enforcement strategies ultimately reflect the decisions of 
individual officials, and those officials’ objectives may reflect various personal rather 
than organizational interests. Officials’ personal calculus might include factors such as 
how much time and energy any given enforcement action will demand, the risks 
associated with targeting powerful actors, and opportunities for career advancement, 
either within enforcement agencies or the private sector, that result from participating 
in innovative or successful enforcement actions. 
 
 As we define them, objectives are broad criteria against which enforcement 
strategies can be evaluated. For any given set of objectives we can also define a more 
concrete set of intermediate goals, namely outcomes that contribute to achievement of 
additional outcomes that promote the overall objective. Agencies’ goals can be defined 
either broadly, as in, ‘vigorously prosecute all allegations of grand corruption,’ or 
narrowly, as in, ‘freeze the Swiss bank accounts maintained by the Minister of Public 
Works’.   
  The enforcement strategies of South American enforcement agencies are 
constrained by an important legal norm, the legality principle, which requires 
prosecutors to prosecute every offense that comes to their attention and, [in some 
cases, to abide by legislatively prescribed sanctions]. Although strict compliance with 
this principle is practically impossible, it certainly reduces South American 
enforcement agencies’ discretion.
19
 Another important feature of these countries, or at 
                                                 
19
 A new wave of “modern” bureacrats have attempted to apply “resulted oriented management” to 
enforcement agencies, but the impact of this trend is more visible in procedures for resource allocation 
 




least the ones we have studied, is that, with the exception of Brazil, the public sector 
bureaucracies tend to be weak. In the present context this means that the agencies have 
difficulty implementing enforcement strategies that reflect a coherent set of 
organizational objectives, as opposed to a variety of potentially divergent personal 
objectives. 
2.3. Coordination defined   
 A convenient way to measure interactions among enforcement agencies is in 
terms of the extent of coordination, which we take to mean working together to 
achieve a common goal.
20
 This definition implies that interactions can vary along two 
dimensions: the extent to which agencies work together and the extent to which their 
enforcement strategies have common goals. 
 
Along the first dimension, imagine a ‘state of nature’ in which agencies act 
wholly independently, possibly even in competition. Our two-dimensional framework 
captures the fact that in this setting the agencies’ enforcement strategies may or may 
not contribute to achieving a common goal. At one extreme are scenarios in which 
agencies pursue perfectly complementary strategies. Suppose for example, that 
different prosecutorial agencies launch separate civil and criminal proceedings against 
the same defendant. If the evidence introduced in one proceeding can be used in the 
other proceeding, thereby reducing the costs of investigation in the later case, the two 
proceedings will complement one another. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
than in decision-making related to the setting of  enforcement objectives or the selection of targets for 
prosecution. 
20
 After surveying the relevant literature Bouckaert et al 2010, 14-19, offer the following definition: 
 
…coordination in a public sector interorganizational context is considered to be the 
instruments and mechanisms that aim to enhance the voluntary or forced alignment of 
tasks and efforts of organizations within the public sector. These mechanisms are used 
in order to create a greater coherence, and to reduce redundancy, lancunae and 
contradictions within and between policies, imple-mentation or management... (16) 
 
This definition is broader than ours in at least two respects. First, it extends to an “agreement, even if 
tacit, of the actors that they will not harm each other’s programmes or operations.” (20) These forms of 
“negative” coordination fall outside of our definition. Second, the Bouckaert et al definition includes 
processes that eliminate the divisions between agencies. We characterize such measures as forms of 
integration rather than coordination.  




At the other extreme are scenarios in which agencies pursue enforcement 
strategies that conflict with one another. The paradigmatic case is one in which 
multiple agencies pursue enforcement actions against the same defendant for the same 
misconduct but one proceeding delays the other, as when civil proceedings are stayed 
pending disposition of a criminal case. The agencies may also seek incompatible 
sanctions. For example, one agency may wish to provide leniency in order to induce 
cooperation while the other agency may seek a severe sanction. Alternatively, the 
defendant may have limited funds and a government agency may seek to impose a fine 
while private plaintiffs seek compensation.    
 
In many settings agencies have progressed beyond the state of nature and 
actually work together across jurisdictional boundaries. Working together involves 
sharing resources and information. It need not, however, involve pursuing the same 
goals.  Different branches of a ministry of justice or an agency might share a building 
or a computer system or the services of a set of police investigators or managerial 
oversight without pursuing the same goals. For now we are particularly interested in 
cases in which agencies work together for the purpose of achieving a common goal.  
We call this pattern of interaction coordination. Indicia of coordination are: 
acknowledgement of common goals; sharing of information required to pursue the 
common goals; provision of information about the effects of actions (feedback); 
adjustment of actions or objectives in response to feedback; and adoption of rules or 




Coordination is facilitated by the existence of coordination mechanisms. These 
include organizations or social networks that establish channels for information flows 
and opportunities for face-to-face interaction, as well as protocols for making decisions 
or formulating rules. Those organizations, networks or protocols can be established 
through hierarchical commands or adopted by explicit or implicit agreements, all of 








 In addition to “hierarchies” and “networks”, Bouckaert et al 2010 (chapter 3) list quasi-markets as 
possible sources of coordination mechanisms. Our study has not revealed any examples of quasi-markets 
being used to influence the behavior of anti-corruption enforcement agencies. 




2.4. Optimal coordination 
Is coordination necessarily desirable? Evaluations of anti-corruption institutions 
frequently identify lack of coordination among enforcement agencies as one of the 
greatest impediments to success in combating corruption.
23
 As a purely theoretical 
matter, however, the value of coordination is ambiguous.  
 
The behavior of enforcement agencies is typically evaluated in terms of fairness, 
efficiency or legitimacy. Uncoordinated action by multiple enforcement agencies poses 
risks along all these dimensions, risks that might well be mitigated by coordination. 
Consider the fairness criterion. Theories of proportionality and equal treatment under 
the law suggest that it is unfair to allow the enforcement process to impose too great a 
burden on defendants, either in absolute terms or relative to the burden borne by other 
defendants. One concern is that the sanctions that result from the enforcement process, 
whether imposed by a single regulator or a combination of agencies, will be unfairly 
harsh. A second concern stems from the fact that regardless of the sanctions imposed, 
enforcement processes themselves can be burdensome for defendants. At some point 
the burden imposed on a particular defendant might be so great that it is unfair. 
Coordination might involve agencies working together to limit the burden experienced 
by defendants.  
 
Coordination might also enhance efficiency. Efficiency is measured by the cost of 
the resources devoted to achieving any given goal. Coordination can promote 
efficiency by avoiding duplication of efforts aimed at common goals. It can also 
involve ensuring that efforts aimed at common goals are undertaken by the agency able 




Finally, consider the relationship between coordination and legitimacy. Legitimacy 
is often used as a general term of commendation, which indicates that a particular 
                                                 
23
 See, for example, [UNCAC 2014 report ; OECD Working Group on Bribery Phase 2 reports on 
Argentina and Brazil.] 
24 Some agencies may be able to access resources more cheaply than others. Or some agencies may have 
better technology, meaning that they can deploy resources more productively. Over time productivity 
will tend to vary as agencies learn – from their own experiences, research and experiments as well as 
those of other agencies. Productivity will also tend to vary as the actors targeted by regulation learn 
about its effects and how to mitigate them. 




authority’s normative actions are perceived as compatible with prevailing norms of 
appropriate conduct. Legitimacy is widely believed to inspire trust and a sense of 
moral obligation to obey.
25
 The literature on point suggests that the legitimacy of 
enforcement agencies will be influenced by the extent to which their actions are 
compatible with fairness and efficiency, as well as the extent to which they comply 
with applicable laws, how accountable they are to people affected by their actions, and 
their effectiveness in achieving combatting crime.
26
 Therefore, to the extent that 
coordination contributes to fairness and efficiency it might also promote legitimacy. 
 
Despite the potential benefits of coordination, there are several reasons why it is 
not guaranteed to enhance fairness, efficiency or legitimacy. First, working together 
can be costly (and thus inefficient). The communication required to achieve 
coordination requires expenditures of both social capital and material resources. The 
associated costs might outweigh any savings associated with coordination and 
compromise efficiency. There is also the risk that by stifling competition, coordination 
will compromise agencies’ incentives to maximize productivity and limit their 
opportunities to learn from divergent enforcement strategies.
27
 A second potentially 
problematic aspect of coordination is that although it involves working together to 
achieve common goals, those goals need not be socially desirable.  In principle, 
enforcement agencies might work together to implement unfair, inefficient or 
illegitimate enforcement strategies. Third, by providing opportunities for actors outside 
of formal organizational structures to participate in decisionmaking, coordination can 
blur responsibility for actions and thereby undermine accountability. 
 
All of this suggests that the optimal level of coordination depends on the applicable 
normative criteria as well as context-specific factors such as the costs of coordination, 
the value of institutional competition and the objectives of the agencies in question. 
This raises the possibility that the optimal institutional arrangement is one which is 
sufficiently flexible to allow for varying degrees of coordination.  
 
                                                 
25
 Weber 1918/1968, Tyler 1990, Johnson et al 2014. 
26
 Tankebe 2013, Johnson et al 2014. 
27
 Carson and Prado 2014, 8. See also Stephan 2012 (discussing benefits of international competition in 
anticorruption enforcement). 




A system which incorporates multiple enforcement institutions that are able but not 
required to coordinate with one another fits this description.
28
 We call this kind of 
system a modular one because for any given function it relies on multiple functionally 
interchangeable units (modules) that are capable of operating either independently or 
in combination with one another.
29
 In the business context, modular organizational 
design has been recognized as a way of capturing the benefits of coordination while 
reducing communication costs and preserving flexibility.
30
 In principle, modularity 
should have the same implications in public sector organizations such as anti-
corruption enforcement agencies. 
 
For example, a modular enforcement system might have three different agencies 
with the power to monitor government procurement, two agencies capable of 
investigating suspicious transactions, and three agencies with the authority to prosecute 
wrongdoers in any one of three different fora. The agencies performing each function 
would be capable of operating independently, and even pursuing different objectives if 
they have legitimate disagreements about how best to serve the public interest. At the 
same time they would be capable of coordinating their activities when necessary to 
enhance efficiency, fairness or legitimacy. 
 
This is not to say that institutional modularity in anti-corruption enforcement is 
unambiguously optimal. If the costs of coordination are prohibitive and hierarchical 
oversight of enforcement institutions is weak, then independence may be optimal. In a 
divided society characterized by fundamental disagreements about the objectives of 
anti-corruption enforcement, tolerance of institutional conflict may be the only 
legitimate approach because it best reflects the range of views among the affected 
population. If corruption is a pressing problem and resources are scarce, then 
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coordination, or even outright integration, may offer compelling advantages in terms of 
efficiency. 
3. Influences on institutional design 
The design of public institutions is typically influenced by a mix of political, 
economic, intellectual and cultural factors, foreign as well as domestic.
31
 As a result, 
there is no reason to presume that the institutions that emerge in any given context will 
be optimal for the society as a whole. Our working hypothesis is that the design of 
anti-corruption agencies will be subject to similar influences.  
 
Political factors seem likely to be especially important. The targets of anti-
corruption institutions include powerful public officials, inherently political actors. It is 
crucial to consider the possibility that they will try to shape anti-corruption institutions 
to suit their own interests. Batory’s examination of the creation, design and evolution 
of anti-corruption agencies in Central Europe illustrates the possible implications of 
political influence.
32
 She argues that politicians created anti-corruption agencies in 
response to scandals in order to satisfy both domestic and international constituencies. 
Cynical politicians designed ACAs with an eye on both the risk that the agency would 
turn on its creators – a risk which was less significant for well-entrenched politicians – 
and the possibility of using it against political opponents. These considerations 
determined whether politicians sought to create agencies that were weak or dependent, 
or both. Over time though, individual agencies’ levels of power and autonomy were 
shaped by both internal factors, such as the competence and charisma of its leaders, 
and external factors, such as attacks by politicans. 
 
Economic factors such as technology, social capital, human capital, and financial 
resources also constrain the design of public institutions. Reviews of integrated anti-
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corruption agencies have attributed their poor performance, at least in part, to 




Although political and economic factors often attract the most attention, ideas also 
matter in the design of public institutions. Just as the regulation of privatized electrical 
utilities has been shaped by intellectual commitments to free markets as opposed to 
statism,
34
 intellectual commitments based in social scientific theories and broader 
ideologies – including those which value fairness, efficiency or legitimacy – might 
shape the institutions charged with regulating corruption.
35
 For instance, at least some 
of the appeal of the integrated approach to anti-corruption institutions can be traced to 
the idea that it represented a proven best practice (although the desire of local officials 
to attract funding from foreign donors cannot be discounted).  
 
Best practices do not necessarily spread on account of their intellectual appeal. As 
we have already hinted, best practices sometimes are adopted for self-serving reasons 
or in response to material inducements offered by powerful actors. Recent literature 
suggests that policymakers responsible for shaping public institutions are sometimes 
motivated by the desire to influence social relationships.
36
 The most commonly cited 
motivations of this kind include the desire to enhance social status and legitimacy or to 
achieve the comfort of conformity. According to this view, local officials might adopt 
best practices such as integrated anti-corruption institutions because they hope to 
enhance their status in the eyes of foreign peers, or simply to conform. 
 
Whatever the explanation, the diffusion of the Hong Kong model underscores the 
point that foreign as well as domestic factors can influence the design of public 
institutions. For countries in the Global South the tendency is to focus on how actors in 
the North influence institutional design. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, 
that models of institutional design sometimes diffuse from among countries in the 
Global South. Langer documents an especially pertinent example.
37
 He shows how 
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criminal procedure reforms originally espoused by Argentine scholars spread through 
Latin America as a result of the actions of a network of Latin American lawyers. To be 
fair, the members of the network were often supported and encouraged by donor 
agencies based in the global North. But according to Langer, the driving intellectual 
forces were Latin Americans and their ideas dominated those of at least one set of 
actors in the global North, namely, the US Department of Justice.
38
 
4. Anti-corruption law enforcement in South America 
Do any anti-corruption institutions actually operate in a modular fashion? 
According to Carson and Prado, the interaction among Brazil’s anti-corruption 
institutions more or less corresponds to our description of a modular system. The only 
difference is that all adjudication ultimately involves the judiciary, which creates a 
bottleneck. In the following sections we extend their analysis of Brazil to five other 
South American countries and examine whether modular anti-corruption institutions 
have emerged in those countries. 
 
The six countries vary in, among other ways, the extent to which corruption is 
regarded as a pressing social problem as well as overall levels of political competition, 
institutional and economic development. As we have discussed, these factors might all 
plausibly affect the attractiveness of institutional modularity, as opposed to pure 
independence, coordination or integration. At the same time, all six countries have a 
roughly similar legal heritage.
39
 This fact, together with their geographic proximity and 
linguistic ties, suggests that the countries’ policymakers are likely to be subject to 
similar social influences. 
4.1. Post-colonial legacies 
Two features of South American history have shaped the interaction of anti-
corruption institutions. The first is a particular understanding of the concept of 
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separation of powers that was prevalent during the formative years of Latin American 
legal systems and still permeates institutional practices. In this view, the state is broken 
down into separate branches or “powers”, each responsible for performing a basic 
function. The main branches are those charged with rule-making (legislature), rule 
execution and administration (executive), and rule application in the context of specific 
disputes (judiciary). The principle of separation of powers is understood strictly, 
implying that each branch of government has its own exclusive sphere of 
competence.
40
 This idea does not sit well with the idea that agencies located in 





 The second significant historical feature is the region’s experience with 
authoritarianism. The mid-nineteenth century, prior to the establishment of 
constitutional systems, was characterized by a high dispersion of territorial power. In 
many areas political power was concentrated in the hands of local caudillos, 
charismatic leaders who usually based their power on force rather than legitimacy. The 
hallmarks of the caudillo model of governance were frequent recourse to institutional 
violence to resolve power disputes and, very much related, a top-down approach to law 
creation and application.
42
 These were prominent features of South American politics 
throughout the twentieth century. This tradition favors the imposition of ideas in a top-
down fashion, rather than as a consequence of a bottom-up debate that includes civil 
society, and so may discourage collaborative approaches to rule creation and 
application.
43
 The top-down approach has arguably survived the return to democratic 




 Authoritarianism in South America –with the exception of Colombia– has also 
contributed to selective enforcement of criminal laws. Until very recently, powerful 
offenders enjoyed almost absolute immunity.
45
 The few clear exceptions in the region 
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have been related to gross violations of human rights in the periods of transition to 
democracy, except for Brazil which  granted and maintained amnestyfor  all crimes 
committed during the military regime.
46
 Convictions of high ranking officials based on 
corruption charges have been extremely exceptional in most countries in the region, 
and in some countries no such convictions have ever occurred. Civil and administrative 
actions are even less common. 
47
  
4.2. Pressures to innovate 
The transition to democracy that has marked the past thirty years of South 
American history has been accompanied by unprecedented efforts to establish the rule 
of law and enforce human rights. During this period South American countries have 
also become more involved in global and regional integration mechanisms. In the 
1990s, inspired by the New Public Management, most countries also received 
international assistance aimed at increasing the efficiency of their bureaucracies. This 
assistance often pointed toward the creation of specialized public sector agencies. 
 
Perhaps as an outgrowth of these trends, since the beginning of the 21
st
 century the 
countries in our study have been active participants in the global anticorruption 
movement. All of the countries have been members of the OAS Anticorruption 
Convention for more than a decade and of UNCAC for an average of seven years. 
Argentina and Brazil were among the first non-OECD countries to sign the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”).
48
 Colombia acceded to the OECD 
Convention in 2013 and Peru is reviewing its legislation with the purpose of becoming 
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ranking officials from Lula administration are also serving prison sentences as a result of the Mensalao 
case. 
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a member. Argentina and Brazil are members of the Financial Action Task Force 
(“FATF”), the leading intergovernmental organization concentrating on money 
laundering and terrorist financing, and all the countries are members of the FATF 
regional body, GAFISUD. 
 
All of these international bodies, and especially the OECD and FATF, have 
mechanisms designed to place pressure on member states to implement the obligations 
and recommendations they have assumed. Donor institutions such as the World Bank, 
USAID and UNODC have funded projects with the objective of strengthening the 
anticorruption institutional framework throughout Latin America, including all the 
countries in our study. International bodies have explicitly identified lack of 
coordination among anticorruption institutions as a problem in almost all of our 
countries.
49
 These external actors have offered significant material inducements for 
countries to create new legal rules and institutions in a wide range of areas related to 
anticorruption law, including access to information, asset disclosure, regulation of 
conflicts of interest, criminal procedure (immunities; statute of limitations, leniency 
agreements), and regulation of money laundering.   
4.3. The multiplicity of anti-corruption institutions 
In our six countries, every branch of government has a role in anticorruption 
enforcement. Those roles do not necessarily correspond to the traditional division of 
powers. There are several examples of agencies that perform multiple functions, 
including some which go beyond the traditional ones. There are also many instances in 
which responsibility for a particular function is distributed across multiple agencies. 
Additionally, many of the countries in our study have created anticorruption agencies 
that do not fit neatly into the conventional tri-partite division of powers. Several of 
those agencies, such as Financial Intelligence Units and specialized anti-corruption 
agencies, have been created within the past two decades as a result of the influence of 
pressure from external actors such as the Financial Action Task Force or donors. 
 
There are also important divisions of responsibility within agencies. This is 
especially true for public prosecutors. In all the countries in our study prosecutors 
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belong to the Public Ministry (Ministerio Publico), a large agency with offices in 
multiple cities and several specialized units. It is not uncommon for more than one 
prosecutor to have jurisdiction over an anticorruption matter. For example, one may 
have jurisdiction over matters that take place in a particular territory and the other may 
have jurisdiction over particular types of misconduct. In the case of the Argentine 
Ministerio Publico, for instance, the Fiscalía de Investigaciones Administrativas, a 
specialized anticorruption prosecution office, might have shared jurisdiction with the 
public prosecutor in charge of the case on the grounds of territorial competence.
50
 To 
treat “the Prosecutor” as a unitary actor would obscure these important divisions and 
the resulting opportunities for conflict, competition, complementarity or coordination 
within the Ministerio Público. Indeed, in many cases it would be appropriate to think 
of each prosecutor as a separate agency with his or her own restricted but autonomous 
domain. The controversial but widely endorsed idea of “internal independence” of 




Our analysis only covers national institutions. Sub-national anti-corruption 
institutions also play important roles in combating corruption and may diverge in 
significant ways from their counterparts at the national level.
52
 We exclude sub-
national institutions for both practical reasons and in order to facilitate cross-country 





Legislative chambers are not only in charge of legislating but also of 
monitoring the acts of the other branches of government. This monitoring is usually 
conducted through the work of subordinate institutions such as Auditors General (in 
Argentina) or legislative committees. Legislators can also request reports from 
executive/administrative agencies or ministries. 
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In all of the countries studied, Special Parliamentary Investigative Commitees 
(SPICs) can be created ad hoc to investigate specific instances of corruption.
54
 These 
commitees do not formally participate in adjudication or the imposition of sanctions. 
They are only empowered to prepare reports which are made public and sent to other 
institutions for further investigation and adjudication. Although they are used 
exceptionally and possess limited powers, SPICs have had a lot of visibility, showing 
the potential of boosting public awareness of corruption cases.  
 
In Brazil, the Tribunal de Contas da União (TCU), which is formally part of the 
legislative branch but enjoys considerable autonomy, plays a unique role in overseeing 
the fiscal activities of the federal government.
55
 The TCU has branches throughout the 
country and a staff of roughly 2,400.
56
 It is presided over by a group of ministers who 
make determinations after receiving information from its staff. The TCU not only 
monitors fiscal activities but also conducts investigations (called audits), adjudicates 
the legality of government actions, imposes sanctions and makes recommendations for 
reform. The sanctions include damages, fines, debarment of private firms (for a period 
of three to five years) and, for officeholders, bars on holding high positions in the civil 
service. The TCU may also report public officials involved in misconduct to the 
electoral courts, which are then required to bar them from running for any sort of 
elected office. Financial sanctions ordered by the TCU are enforced by the federal 
attorney general (AGU) and the judiciary. Determinations of responsibility and 
sanctions imposed by the TCU can be appealed to the judiciary. 
Executive  
In most of our countries, several agencies within the executive branch engage 
in anti-corruption enforcement. These include the police, specialized anti-corruption 
agencies, FIUs, auditors and disciplinary bodies. Some agencies perform multiple 
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functions and agencies with the same name in different countries do not necessarily 
perform the same functions.  
 
In the traditional model, the most important law enforcement agency in the 
executive branch is the police force. The police assist in investigation, under the 
direction of prosecutors. In the past two decades, many police forces have become 
more professional and have created internal units for specialized tasks such as 
investigation of complex or economic offenses and anticorruption activities. It is worth 
noting that some countries have multiple police forces. For instance, in Colombia and 
Paraguay there is a “judicial police”, under the jurisdiction of the Public Prosecutor, 
which complements the work of the Executive branch’s police force. In Brazil, police 
forces are divided into military and civil branches and only the civil branch is 
responsible for investigations overseen by the public prosecutor and judges. Bolivia 
and Peru, on their part, have both created special anticorruption police units, which 
work at the request and under the supervision of the prosecutors.   
 
In addition to police, every country in our study has a specialized anti-
corruption agency located in the executive branch of the national government. The 
functions of these agencies vary. In Argentina, the Anticorruption Office is empowered 
to design preventive measures, educate officials about their legal obligations, monitor 
public officials’ asset disclosures and conflict of interest declarations, conduct 
investigations, appear in court acting as criminal plaintiff (“querellante”) to prosecute 
corruption offenses and, when acting as “querellante”, appeal judicial decisions. In 
Paraguay, the recently created Anticorruption National Secretary is empowered to 
coordinate and monitor anticorruption and transparency policies, promote strategies to 
prevent corruption, receive reports and distribute them to enforcement authorities, and 
assess transparency and anticorruption measures implemented by state agencies. In 
Peru, the Comisión Nacional Anticorrupción (CAN) coordinates the efforts of the 
different public agencies empowered to prevent, investigate, prosecute or punish acts 
of corruption and its members consist of representatives of those agencies. CAN’s 
decisions are not binding on the Public Prosecutor or the Judiciary. In Colombia, the 






 has a mandate to advise and support the President in the 
development and implementation of a transparency and anti-corruption policy, 
including through   the development of preventive anticorruption tools, coordinating 
execution of the transparency policy, and analyzing internal control reports. For its 
part, Bolivia has a Ministry of Institutional Transparency and Fight against Corruption 
(MTILCC) whose main functions include: formulating and implementing policies on 
the fight against corruption; proposing draft regulatory standards for eliminating 
corruption; promoting citizen education programs; presenting charges for acts of 
corruption; and, coordinating the investigation, follow-up, and monitoring of acts of 
corruption and judicial proceedings against such acts. Strictly speaking Brazil does not 
have an anti-corruption agency, but the federal government does have the 
Controladoria General da União (CGU) (Office of the Comptroller General) which 
engages in both monitoring and investigation aimed at misuse or misappropriation of 
federal government funds.  
 
Every country in our study also has an FIU located in the executive branch. For 
the purposes of anti-corruption enforcement they serve primarily to help detect 
instances of laundering of the proceeds of corruption. Some FIUs are empowered to do 
more than just to monitor and report suspicious activity to prosecutors. In Argentina, 
for instance, the FIU can also appear in court itself and push investigations forward 
when acting as a criminal plaintiff (“querellante”). 
 
Aside from the police and FIUs, there are other agencies in the executive 
branch that play a role in enforcing anti-corruption norms. For instance, organizations 
located in the executive branch, including state-owned enterprises, typically include 
units charged with conducting “internal audits”. These units may or may not be subject 
to centralized oversight. In Argentina the units that play this role are overseen by the 
Sindicatura General de la Nación (SIGEN). Among other functions, it is empowered 
to create and apply internal control norms, to supervise the application of those norms 
by the internal audit units, monitor compliance with the applicable accounting 
standards, oversee the proper functioning of the internal control system, etc.
58
 The 
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Paraguayan General Audit of the Executive Power performs similar functions.
59
 In 
PeruPerú, by contrast, each of the Ministries in the executive branch has an Oficina 
General de Administración (OGA), a unit which is in charge of monitoring the 
administrative supply services, accounting and treasury, budget control and personnel. 
The OGAs work in coordination with the Contraloría General de la República 
reporting to it the irregularities they find, so that the Contraloría can proceed in 
accordance with its powers. In Colombia, each state entity has an internal control 
office and there is no centralized agency to which they must report. These offices are 
responsible for overseeing the internal control systems. Moreover, each agency has a 
disciplinary office that controls the behavior of the public officials and has the power 
to punish them, if it is the case. The Procuraduria General de la Nación is independent 
of other branches of government and can, when it deems necessary, displace the 
internal disciplinary offices in the investigation and punishment of the acts of public 
officials. In Bolivia and Paraguay, all public institutions have created “transparency” 
(in the case of Bolivia) or “anti-corruption (in the case of Paraguay) in all ministries 
and several agencies of the Executive, whether autonomous or not. These units not 
only promote transparency, but also receive and analyze complaints, and coordinate 
with the Prosecutor’s office, in the case of Paraguay and with the Ministry of 
Transparency and the Fight against Corruption, in the case of Bolivia the information 
flow.   
 Corruption on the part of public employees can be investigated, adjudicated and 
sanctioned through administrative processes, meaning without the involvement of any 
branch of government outside the executive –though administrative decisions are 
subjected to judicial review. These processes are generally rather decentralized. In 
administrative disciplinary proceedings in Brazil’s executive branch the investigators 
and adjudicators are not individuals who specialize in those tasks, but rather are public 
employees, who may or not have special training.
60
 To avoid the selection of peers of 
the defendant, a program has been launched to locate adjudicators in other states who 
participate in the proceedings by videoconference. The system is overseen by a branch 
of the CGU, the Corregedoria Geral da União (CRG), which plays a quasi-regulatory 
role by training public officials in its application, coordinating proceedings and 
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 In Argentina, by contrast, the system is more 
decentralized but is implemented by specialized staff. Administrative proceedings 
(sumarios administrativos) have to be initiated in the jurisdiction where the event 
occurs, by the oficina de sumarios for the relevant area, and permanent staff lawyers 
are responsible for the proceedings.
62
 The Treasury Attorney’s Office (Procuración del 
Tesoro de la Nación) also has jurisdiction in certain cases involving high ranking 
officials.
63
 Moreover, the office of the specialized anticorruption prosecutor (the 
Fiscalía de Investigaciones Administrativas) must be notified of the initiation of every 





Anticorruption enforcement also benefits from the work of a variety of actors 
that do not specialize in law enforcement. For instance, in-house legal departments and 
human resources offices play important roles in educating public officials about their 
duties and the strictures imposed by law and codes of conduct.
65
 Meanwhile, 
regulatory agencies responsible for areas such as securities, banking, legal persons and 
public procurement engage in monitoring and investigation that can help to uncover 
cases of corruption.
66
 In the case of countries in which public services have been 
privatized, agencies that supervise private suppliers of public services are also 
important sources of information. For example, in Argentina special agencies monitor 
provision of electricity, gas and water by private companies. These agencies are 
empowered to produce reports and transmit findings of illegal practices to the 
Ministerio Público or the Judiciary.
67
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 In most of the countries in our study there are multiple courts in which 
corruption cases can be adjudicated. This is because courts’ jurisdiction is typically 
defined by the type of proceeding (criminal, civil,
68
 or appeal from an administrative 
determination) and where the misconduct occurred. One country in our study, Peru, 
has a court that specializes in adjudication of criminal cases involving corruption of 
public officials and Bolivia has already passed a law creating them and it is in the 
process of implementation.  
 
Prosecutors 
In Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru and Paraguay, the institution responsible for 
public prosecutions, both civil and criminal, is an autonomous agency which belongs 
to neither the Executive nor the Judiciary. It is called either the Ministerio Público 
(Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Paraguay) or Fiscalía General (Bolivia). In Colombia, the 
Fiscalía General de la Nación, which has a prosecutorial role, belongs to the Judiciary 
–although it has administrative and financial autonomy– while the Ministerio Publico, 
which comprises both prosecutors (La Procuraduría General de la Nación) and an 
ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), is an autonomous agency that does not belong to 
either the Executive or the Judiciary. In Argentina, the Ministerio Público comprises 
both prosecutors (Ministerio Público Fiscal) and public defenders (Ministerio Público 
de la Defensa). In the two federal countries, Argentina and Brazil, the states have their 
own Ministerio/Ministério Público, which are also autonomous.  
 
Most of the countries have established specialized units within the 
Ministerio/Ministério Público to prosecute cases involving corruption of public 
officials. In some cases, like in Paraguay or Argentina, these offices both conduct the 
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investigation and represent the public at trial. In other cases, they only provide 
investigative services for prosecutors who require specific assistance in areas in which 
the prosecutors have no specific training (usually, forensic accounting, financial 
analysis and international asset tracing). Specialized prosecutorial offices may 
intervene based on objective criteria, such as whether the amount of money embezzled 
exceeds a certain figure, or more subjective criteria, such as the social harm or 
institutional impact of the case.  
 
After the collapse of the Fujimori regime in 2000, Peru re-organized the 
agencies responsible for prosecution of corruption offences. More recently, Bolivia 
followed suit. The resulting institutional framework is quite different from that of the 
other countries in our study, as those prosecutors only deal with corruption cases. Both 
countries had also established, “asset recovery units”, though they are not located in 
the prosecutor’s office but within the Executive, within the Ministry of Justice in the 
case of Peru, and within the Ministry of Transparency and the fight against Corruption 
in the case of Bolivia.  
  
Auditors General and Contralorías   
Most of the countries in our study have agencies that are independent of any of 
the traditional branches of government which are responsible for overseeing fiscal 
management of public bodies and state-owned enterprises. In Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Peru and Paraguay they are called contralorías/controladorias (Colombia 
also has an independent Auditor General responsible for overseeing the national and 
subnational contralorías). In Argentina, this auditing function is divided between 
internal auditors of the Executive Branch (the Sindicatura General de la Nación) and 
an external body, the Auditoria General, which belongs to the legislative branch, 
although it is functionally autonomous.   
 
Civil society and private firms 
  In most countries, civil society has played a crucial role in ‘monitoring the monitors’: 
holding public hearings when appointments are being made to  key supervisory positions; 




advocating for the adoption of recommendations issued by monitoring agencies; and 
publicizing conflicts of interest on the part of key enforcement officials. In countries such as 
Argentina and Brazil, NGOs’ capacities have been enhanced by transparency and access to 
information laws.
69
 NGOs can also play a role in educating government officials, private firms, 
and the general public about anticorruption norms. There are even examples of governments 
partnering with NGOs to publish educational materials and even to monitor compliance with 
settlement agreements in prominent cases. In Colombia, for example, the mission of the 
Comisión Nacional Ciudadana para la Lucha contra la Corrupción is to allow civil society to 
contribute to monitoring of policies, programs and actions created and implemented by the 
national government in the prevention, control and punishment of corruption.
70
 Bolivia has 
recently gone a step further. Based on the constitutional principle of “participation and social 
control”, it passed a law regulating the creation of self-organized civil society groups that exert 
a close control over the public administration especially over those goods and services that 
affect each group directly. In the last two years, more than 750 groups had registered   
 
Private firms also play a role in enforcing anticorruption laws. The practice of 
holding corporations liable for corruption, which is widespread in the USA and a 
growing trend in other OECD countries, is now reaching South America.  In some 
countries corporations can be held criminally liable, as in Colombia
71
 (and under 
proposed legislation in Argentina), and Peru)
72
 while in Brazil they can be held liable 
through civil and administrative proceedings.
73
 Together with the introduction of 
leniency provisions, these enforcement practices create incentives for firms to 
cooperate with enforcement agencies and establish or strengthen anticorruption 
compliance programs.  
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The table in the appendix summarizes how various enforcement activities are 
distributed across public institutions in our six countries. 
 
4.4. Coordination mechanisms 
It should be clear by this point that formal responsibility for anticorruption 
enforcement in our six countries is divided among multiple agencies or units within 
agencies. The next step is to determine how those agencies or units interact with one 
another, and in particular, the extent to which they coordinate their activities. We treat 
the existence of coordination mechanisms, both formal and informal, as indicia of 
coordination. We define the concept of a coordination mechanism broadly to include 
all sorts of patterns of communication and methods conducive to the achivement of  a 
common goal. We include both interagency and intraagency coordination mechanisms. 
 
Some mechanisms enable coordination among agencies or units performing the 
same function. For example, agencies involved in monitoring might agree on which 
types of data will be collected by each agency; investigative agencies might create 
common databases; or prosecutors might agree on the sequence of proceedings. Other 
forms of coordination involve agencies that perform different functions. Agencies that 
monitor might agree with agencies that investigate on the types of incidents monitors 
should flag for investigation (and then follow through by transferring information 
about those incidents on a regular basis). Or investigators might communicate with 
prosecutors to ensure that investigative reports cover all legally relevant facts and are 
comprehensible to prosecutors and judges.  
 
In general, we find that Brazil and Peru have the most highly developed and formal 
sets of coordination mechanisms, but the two countries have adopted rather different 
approaches to achieving coordination. Peru has created specialized agencies for each 
phase in the enforcement process. This tends to facilitate coordination among actors 
performing the same function. Brazil, by contrast, typically has multiple agencies 
performing any given function but has created many formal mechanisms to support 
inter-agency coordination. Brazil has also created numerous intra-agency coordination 
mechanisms. 




Coordination of monitoring 
 It is not uncommon for several different agencies to “own” separate pieces of 
information about corrupt activity. For example, the FIU might have information about 
financial transactions and the public registry might contain information about the 
beneficial owner of the private company. Assembling all the pieces of the puzzle into 
useful information and transmitting it to investigators requires coordination. 
 
In Brazil, the Secretaria Federal de Controle Interno, a part of the 
Controladoria Geral da União (CGU), is responsible for finding information about 
possible corrupt practices held by other agencies of the federal government and 
determining which enforcement agency, including both disciplinary bodies and 
prosecutors, should receive the information.
74
   
 
  In Argentina, both the National Anticorruption Office, in change of moniroting 
public official’s declarations of assets, as well as the the FIU, in charge of monitoring 
suspicious transactions reported by anti-money laundering gatekeepers, have strenghen 
their monitoring capacities by getting instant access to existing databases –eg., 
different public registries- and by coordinating monitoring criteria among them –e.g.,  
the OA performs enhanced monitoring over “politically exposed persons”, a criteria 
defined by the FIU regulatory power.  
Coordination of investigation 
Coordination among investigating agencies promises to enhance efficiency by not 
only avoiding duplication of effort but also taking advantage of complementary skill 
sets. Investigation of corruption demands the use of special techniques. On the one 
hand, like investigations aimed at organized crime, investigation of corruption may 
require surveillance, the use of informants, undercover agents, sting operations, or wire 
tapping, all techniques which require judicial authorization if the evidence gathered is 
to be introduced in court proceedings.
75
 On the other hand, since corruption usually 
involves complex economic transactions, forensic analysis and information processing 
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technology are usually required. Coordination is valuable if no single agency possesses 
all of these technical capabilities. 
 
Coordination also helps to ensure that the results of investigations are useful at 
subsequent stages of the enforcement process, in terms of form, substance, and manner 
of production. In Brazil, for instance, the MP and the Police have had difficulty 
understanding and using reports produced by the CGU and TCU, on account of both 




In Peru, the existence of specialized anticorruption prosecutor’s offices and 
criminal courts limits the need for interagency cooperation in investigation. In the 
other countries in our study a variety of forms of cooperation have emerged.  
 
In the past decade Brazil has created a number of task forces to undertake joint 
investigations. Many of the most famous corruption cases in Brazil in last decade were 
brought to light by investigative task forces involving agencies such as the CGU, the 
DPF, the MPE, the MPF, the Banco Central, and the COAF.
77
 The number of 
investigative taskforces in Brazil has increased dramatically in recent years, from two 
in 2006 to more than thirty in 2011.
78
  Most involve the Federal Police, the Ministério 
Público, the CGU and the TCU.
79
 These taskforces usually are established on a case-
by-case basis.
80
 There are, however, a few examples of longstanding taskforces, such 
as the Força Tarefa Previdenciária, in which the Federal Police, the Social Security 
Ministry and Public Prosecutors work together on fraud cases related to pension 
funds.
81
  A striking feature of the Brazilian scheme is that the CGU contains a body, 
the Diretoria de Operação Especiais, dedicated to planning the creation of task forces 
that involve the CGU and other agencies. The NAE – Núcleo de Ações Estratégicas – 
concludes the deals with other institions.
82
 Another body known as the DRCI, which is 
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located in the Ministry of Justice, helps Brazilian enforcement authorities coordinate 
with foreign authorities. 
 
Brazil has also developed internal coordination mechanisms. For instance, in 
the CGU the Executive Secretary is responsible for coordinating and “making the 
bridge between the Minister’s office and the other areas”. For example, in the case of 
an audit involving potential misconduct on the part of public employees, both SFC 
(Internal Control) and Corregedorias will deal with the case. The Executive Secretary’s 





 Our other countries have task forces aimed at specific types of fraud. For 
example, following a longstanding practice, the Argentine General Prosecutor has 
created task forces for the prosecution of fraud and corruption cases in areas such as  
the social security system and programs for provision of pharmaceuticals, or for tax 
fraud. Currently all these areas fall within the mandate of a new specialized office on 
economic crime and money laundering within the Public Ministry called PROCELAC. 
PROCELAC has multidisciplinary teams and can provide technical assistance in 
especially complex cases. It can also act as a prosecutor and direct certain types of 
investigations. In Paraguay the Judicial Support Office for the Judgment of Economic 




Creating an organization like a task force or an integrated investigative agency 
is not the only way of coordinating investigations. Sharing information is less 
demanding but also qualifies as a form of coordination. The most sophisticated 
information sharing mechanisms are electronic databases to which police, prosecutors, 
and investigative magistrates all have access. As one interviewee from Brazil puts it, 
“if we didn’t integrate the databases, they are not effective […] if the Police with my 
database does not know that CGU has another database that if merged to mine can 
bring significant improvements for my task”.
85
 Several of our interviewees in Brazil 
emphasized that these kinds of databases must be accessible and publicized in order to 
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be effective coordination mechanisms.. In the countries we have studied it was 
common to find enforcement officials who were not aware of databases that could be 
useful to their work.
86
 Though within the Executive, Bolivia has recently integrated 13 
databases to which prosecutors also have access for investigative purposes. In all of the 
countries we have studied, scarcity of material and human resources remain obstacles 




Coordination in prosecution   
Coordination in prosecution can avoid duplication of effort when multiple 
prosecutors launch proceedings aimed at the same conduct. There also opportunities to 
benefit from bringing together prosecutors with complementary expertise. Finally, 
coordination can help to avoid conflict when prosecutors disagree about issues such as 
when to gather evidence or release information about the case to the media.   
 
Coordination mechanisms in this context have to overcome the obstacles posed 
by legal rules – or the interpretations that have been given to such rules – that 
guarantee the “internal functional independence” of prosecutors.
88
 They also have to 
overcome prosecutors’ natural interests in status and power, which pull in the 
directions of competition and conflict rather than cooperation. These may lead 
prosecutors to regard the work of other colleagues on the same case as an “invasion” 
rather than a contribution to achievement of a common goal.  
 
Most efforts to coordinate prosecution of anti-corruption cases are aimed at 
intra-institutional cooperation. An issue of particular concern is duplication of effort by 
prosecutors pursuing civil and criminal proceedings targetting the same corrupt acts.
89
 
In Brazil prosecutors have developed a variety of mechanisms for coordinating these 
kinds of efforts, including “lending” evidence from one process to the other, requiring 
evidence to be shared between units responsible for civil and criminal proceedings, or 
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even producing evidence just once for use in both civil and criminal proceedings.  
These practices still face strong resistance stemming from factors such as “cultural 
stratification” between criminal and civil law and institutions
90
 and the constitutional 
principle of functional independence of the members of the MP.
91
 Similarly, the AGU 
has created the Grupo de Atuação Pro-Ativa, a unit dedicated full time to anti-
corruption and improbity cases, although the results to date have not been impressive.
92
 
Similar steps have been taken in Paraguay, where the Ministerio Público is responsible 
for both prosecuting cases involving both corrupt acts of public officials and illicit 
enrichment. A specialized Anticorruption Unit is in charge of the investigation and 
prosecution of allegations of corruption. That unit is in turn divided into eleven sub-
units which appear to coordinate successfully. In Argentina, these types of 
coordination mechanisms, involving both the Ministerio Público and the Judiciary, 
have been attempted for cases involving crimes against humanity, but not for 
corruption cases.   
 
We have found only a few examples of inter-institutional coordination 
mechanisms in prosecution. These involve administrative proceedings in Brazil,  
criminal cases in Argentina that have been prosecuted by different state agencies 
working together
93
, and criminal cases in Bolivia, where the Ministry of Transparency 
and the Fight agains Corruption can intervene in the criminal proceeding with or 
without becoming a party.    
Coordination in adjudication 
 There are several potential benefits of coordination in adjudication. First, it can 
enhance efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort. This typically can be 
accomplished by avoiding concurrent proceedings and ensuring that determinations 
made in previous proceedings are taken into account by tribunals in subsequent 
proceedings. Coordination can also be designed to ensure that issues are resolved by 
tribunals with appropriate expertise. Yet another goal may be to prevent defendants 
from being subjected to multiple proceedings, which might be considered unfair.  
                                                 
90
 Interview 12. 
91
 Interview 12 and 14. 
92
 Interview 13  
93
 Interview 13. 




Finally, coordination may be aimed at avoiding proceedings that lead to inconsistent 
results, a situation that arguably calls into question the legitimacy of the legal system. . 
 
 The countries in our study generally have well-developed legal rules that serve 
to coordinate criminal and other types of proceedings. These rules fall into three 
categories. First, the fundamental principle of ne bis in idem bars multiple criminal 
proceedings against the same defendant arising out of the same facts.
94
 Second, there 
are rules to ensure that criminal proceedings are resolved before civil proceedings 
arising out of the same facts.
95
 Third, findings of fact in criminal cases are universally 
treated as conclusive in civil proceedings.
96
 Findings from prior civil proceedings do 
not have a comparable effect in criminal proceedings, presumably because the burden 
of proof in criminal proceedings is higher.
97
 However, when the decision in the 
criminal trial depends on specific findings in the civil proceeding, such as regarding a 
commercial bankruptcy or the validity of a marriage, there can be no criminal 




 Aside from these rules concerning criminal proceedings, and an analogous set 
of rules giving tax proceedings priority over other proceedings,
99
 there is little 
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coordination in adjudication. In some countries efforts have been made to ensure that 
determinations in administrative proceedings are reported to prosecutors or to the 
judiciary.
100
 The general principle, however, is that criminal, civil, administrative, 
legislative and fiscal proceedings are all independent of one another. As a 
consequence, a single corrupt act may lead to separate proceedings in both criminal 
and civil courts, disciplinary proceedings before some sort of administrative body, a 
special legislative inquiry, and an audit. 
Coordination of sanctioning 
 Coordination in sanctioning mainly involves actors responsible for imposing 
sanctions taking one another’s actions into account. Sometimes the other sanction has a 
mitigating effect, as in cases where an agency deducts a previously imposed fine from 
its own fine to ensure that the cumulative penalty is not excessive. This kind of 
coordination helps to ensure that the combined sanctions are consistent with shared 
objectives such as retribution or deterrence. There are also cases in which the other 
agency’s sanction serves as an aggravating factor. For example, debarment often 
involves an agency sanctioning an actor precisely because they have been sanctioned 
by some other agency. Similarly, civil society may use tactics of naming and shaming 
to impose reputational costs on firms that have been sanctioned by public actors. This 
kind of coordination can be an efficient way of enhancing the potency of 
anticorruption law when public institutions are ineffectual. 
 
Several of the countries in our study have created registries or databases 
designed to help government agencies identify debarred firms. These include the 
Cadastro Nacional de Improbidade, Cadastro de Empresas Inidôneas e Suspensas in 
Brazil, the Public Procurement System and the CONTROLEG II  in Bolivia and the 
system used by the Public Procurement Directorate of Paraguay.  
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Coordination with the private sector 
  An interesting new trend in Colombia and Peru is the expressed desire of anti-
corruption authorities to achieve coordination not only among the different relevant 
public institutions but also with the private sector. Recent initiatives are directed at 
both involving the private sector in preventive mechanisms (both at the company level 
and through public-private initiatives) and bringing the private sector closer to the 
enforcement authorities (e.g. through special channels to report misconduct). In 
Bolivia, such debates with the private sector are taking place within the framework 
provided by the “National Council against Corruption”, a private-public which is 
composed by six public institutions and 30 civil society organizations including 
unions, and groups from the private sector. Brazil has already taken such a step, by 
introducing leniency agreements partially based on the effectiveness of compliance 
programs and the cooperation from the private sector. The law, which entered into 
force in 2014, is being currently tested with high profile cases.  
5. Brazil as an exceptionally hospitable context for modularity? 
As others have observed, at the federal level Brazilian anticorruption agencies 
appear to embrace both the overall objective of combatting corruption and the idea of 
coordinating their efforts in order to enhance effectiveness.
101
 These are the key 
elements of the modular approach to anticorruption enforcement. And it seems to be 
working in  Brazil. In recent years there have been several successful enforcement 
actions involving high-ranking public officials. In fact, Praça and Taylor’s analysis 
suggests that the success of the Brazilian anticorruption institutions now may be a self-
reinforcing phenomenon. They claim that over the past thirty years, interactions across 
anticorruption institutions have spurred incremental institutional changes that have 
often, though not always, led to improvements in performance.
102
 
There is little evidence that the modular approach to anticorruption enforcement is 
viable outside the intellectual, political, institutional, economic context of Brazil. It has 
not caught on in the other countries we have studied. At least one country, Peru, has 
opted for a more integrated model. [Several of] the other countries have multiple 
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anticorruption institutions performing the same function, but none of them has 
developed coordination mechanisms as effective as those in Brazil. This is despite the 
fact that lack of coordination is widely viewed as a key impediment to improvement of 
anti-corruption enforcement. The general view is that although all of the countries we 
have studied have made progress in dealing with cases of low-level ‘adminstrative’ 
corruption, coordination problems have impeded progress in tackling high level 
political corruption.   
In short, Brazil appears to be exceptional when it comes to implementation of 
institutional modularity in anti-corruption enforcement. This is consistent with the fact 
that Brazil’s public service, at least at the federal level, is generally regarded as 
exceptional for the region. Brazil has established a merit-based system for recruitment 
and promotion of employees while other Latin American bureaucracies are seldom 
characterized by regularized and impersonal procedures and employment decisions 
based on technical qualifications and merit. With the exception of Brazil, the other 
countries in our study suffer from tremendous difficulties in creating a stable and 
professional civil services.
103
 The professionalization and depoliticization of the 
Brazilian bureacracy may explain why political interests have had less influence on 
anticorruption enforcement in Brazil than in any of the other countries we have 
studied.  
A variety of factors have led the anticorruption institutions in other South 
American countries to develop along different paths. In Peru the issue seems to be that 
modularity is not clearly superior to the prevailing alternative. Peru’s current set of 
anticorruption institutions were redesigned after the fall of the Fujimori regime to 
respond to corruption committed during the Fujimori era. The Peruvian model favors 
integration; all the actors responsible for a given function are typically located in a 
single agency. Peru achieved a fair amount of success in prosecuting high-ranking 
officials from the Fujimori regime,  and so there is no obvious reason for them to reject 
their current model. 
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The experiences in Argentina and Bolivia illustrate the significance of political 
factors. Although Argentina often has multiple anticorruption agencies performing any 
given function, political influence has prevented them from achieving the kind of 
independence that is the hallmark of a modular regime. Many high-ranking members 
of the executive branch, including the President, the Vice-President and a good number 
of ministers, have been implicated in corruption scandals. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
problem of corruption has been conspicuously absent from the government’s rhetoric. 
The absence of direction from the top together with the fear of acting contrary to the 
interests of top officials has led anticorruption officials to keep a low profile, even 
when there is no indication that a specific political leader will be implicated. 
Investigations and prosecutions of high-level officials tend to move forward only when 
political protection from the top has been withdrawn; defendant public officials tend to 
be subject to investigation and trial only after they have left office, or near the end of a 
political cycle. There have also been anticorruption initiatives aimed at lower-level 
officials, involving, e.g., the social security system or the healthcare system for retired 
people. Targets have included schemes that undermined public policies at the core of 
the Government’s agenda (e.g. the reform of the armed and security forces). Even in 
these cases the tendency to do the job quietly, i.e. to avoid public attention, has 
inhibited coordination. 
 
In Bolivia, the situation is somewhat different. Some anticorruption agencies have 
achieved independence, but they have divergent objectives. In Bolivia, the creation of 
the Ministry of Institutional Transparency and Fight against Corruption, an entire state 
department devoted solely to promotion of transparency and prosecution of corruption, 
made a strong anticorruption statement.  As a result, the enforcement and 
implementation of anti-corruption laws and policies is dominated by the executive.  On 
the one hand, this puts anti-corruption rhetoric at the center of the public debate and 
promotes institutional commitment to transparency and the fight against corruption. On 
the other hand, the risk of strategic political use of anti-corruption policies by the 
Executive can generate resistance and inhibition from agencies associated with other 
branches of the government. Specifically, in many instances the political use of the 
anti-corruption framework by the executive and public authorities within its domain 
causes prosecutors and judges to withdraw and refrain from cooperating. Possibilities 




for coordination, particularly between law enforcement and monitoring authorities, are 
therefore reduced.   
 Paraguay illustrates yet another challenge to implementing institutional 
modularity: coordination mechanisms require time and experience to develop. Officials 
in the specialized anticorruption agency emphasize that conditions for joint work 
cannot be created be artificially; there must be something more than just a 
document.
104
 Building bonds of trust among different agencies and officials is a 
gradual process. Experience is essential,
105
 but once experience has been gathered 
inter-institutional relations must be formalized in order develop a stable institutional 
practice founded on more than just personal ties.
106
 In Paraguay, coordination 
mechanisms exist mainly on paper. In the last two decades, at least three national anti-
corruption programs have been designed and implemented. Sponsored by international 
actors such as the UN and USAID, these programs have achieved many results in 
terms of norms creation and institutional redesign, but they still have not succeeded in 
building effective anti-corruption practices. Paraguay now has a complete legal and 
institutional anti-corruption framework but lacks major enforcement experience. 
Coordination is therefore restricted to formal agreements with no practical 
implications. Most instances of cooperation occur  been between public officials who 
were previously linked  by bonds of trust.  
Colombia is also revising its domestic legislation in order to comply with the 
OECD Convention, of which it became a member in 2013.  Anti-corruption efforts are 
oriented to the enhancement of competition, the involvement of the private sector, 
protections and rewards for whistleblowers, and public-private partnerships to tackle 
corruption in a collective fashion. Most of these initiatives are, however, so recent that 
there is yet not much data to evaluate. Before this recent trend, the issue of corruption 
in Colombia was practically ignored as it was closely associated with the violence the 
country experienced in conflicts with drug barons and paramilitary organizations.  
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It is an article of faith among many comparative law scholars that it is possible 
for legal systems to learn from one another. If there is a single area in which cross-
country learning is likely to be valuable it is in the regulation of political corruption, 
which left unchecked poses a fundamental threat to the efficacy of the state. This 
provides a powerful motivation for examining whether anti-corruption laws and 
enforcement mechanisms that have performed well in one legal system can be adopted 
in other systems.  
Since there has been a significant amount of convergence in substantive anti-
corruption law this study has focused on comparing the ways in which those laws are 
enforced. There is no good reason to believe that the formal characteristics of 
individual countries’ enforcement institutions are important determinants of their 
performance. Therefore, like most modern studies of comparative law, we have 
concentrated on the functional characteristics of the regimes we have studied. We are 
particularly interested in characteristics likely to affect performance measured in terms 
of fairness, efficiency and legitimacy. 
The specific countries and institutional characteristics we have analyzed were 
selected on the basis of a theoretical hunch. There are good reasons, corroborated by 
recent experience in Brazil, to believe that the potential for inter-institutional 
coordination, which we distill into the concept of institutional modularity, will be a 
determinant of the performance of anti-corruption enforcement institutions. 
Accordingly our analysis has focused on institutional modularity in national anti-
corruption institutions in Brazil and several of its neighboring countries. 
The most challenging and potentially novel feature of this analysis was the 
effort to  canvass the full range of institutions that play a role in enforcing anti-
corruption norms. This was necessitated by our conviction that it is important to define 
enforcement broadly to include monitoring, investigation, adjudication, sanctioning 
and publicity. That premise forced us to examine not only the judiciary and the police, 
but also a range of institutions that are not often the subjects of comparative legal 
analysis, and especially not in combination. Our results show that the same functions 
or combinations of functions are often performed by different institutions in different 




countries. In the area of anti-corruption law enforcement at least, we are now 
convinced that a cross-country analysis limited either to a particular area of law, say 
civil, criminal or administrative law, or to a particular set of institutions, such as the 
courts and police, carries a serious risk of being misleading. This risk may be present 
in other areas of law enforcement. 
Our cross-country comparison also reveals that, for better or worse, Brazil’s 
neighbors have not converged on highly modular anti-corruption enforcement regimes.  
There is no single best explanation for why we have failed to observe functional 
convergence. Political interference, resource constraints, the absence of a depoliticized  
meritocratic bureaucracy, limited experience, the availability of arrangements with 
comparable appeal – all of these factors appear to cause institutional divergence. Many 
of these factors are likely to be difficult to overcome in the short term. This set of 
findings would be troubling if we were convinced that institutional modularity was the 
uniquely optimal approach to anti-corruption enforcement. However, the indications 
from Peru that other institutional arrangements might offer comparable performance 
suggests that pessimism would be premature. A definitive assessment of the merits of 
institutional modularity in enforcement of anti-corruption law will require more in-
depth analysis of the performance of modular regimes and their alternatives.  
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  Table 1 - Distribution of enforcement activities across institutions 
  Monitoring Investigation Prosecution Judgement Sanctioning Education 
Argentina 
Oficina Anticorrupción; 
Unidade de Informácion 
Financiera; Auditoria 
General de la Nación; 
Sindicatura General de la 
Nación 
Oficina Anticorrupción; 
Unidade de Informácion 
Financiera [UIF]; Fiscalìa 
Nacional de Investigaciones 
Administrativas; Procuradoría 
de Criminalidad Económica y 
Lavado de Activos 
[PROCELAC]; Polícia 
Federal; Ministério Público; 
Poder Judicial 
Ministério Público Poder Judicial Poder Judicial Oficina Anticorrupción 
Bolivia 
Ministerio de Transparencia; 
Assemblea Legislativa 
Plurinacional; Unidad de 
Auditoria Interna; Unidad de 
Transparencia (in some 
Ministerios); Controlador 
General del Estado; Unidad 
de Inteligencia Financera 
[UIF] 
Ministerio de Transparencia; 
Tribunales y Juzgados Anti-
corrupcion; Fiscales 
especializados; Judiciário; 
Fiscal General del Estado; 
Policia Boliviana 
(Min. de Gobierno); 
Assemblea Legislativa 
Plurinacional; Unidad de 
Auditoria Interna; Controlador 
General del Estado 
(in case of fortunes) 
Ministerio de Transparencia 
(as civil part); Tribunales y 
Juzgados Anti-corrupcion; 
Fiscales especializados; 
Fiscal General del Estado 
Judiciário Judiciário Unidad de Transparencia 
Brazil 
Controladoria Geral da 
União [CGU-CRG and SFC]; 
Corregedorias, COAF/MF; 
Comitês de Ética e Comissão 
de Ética Pública [CEP]; 
Tribunal de Contas da União 
[TCU] 
Comitês de Ética e Comissão 
de Ética Pública [CEP]; 
Controladoria Geral da União 
[CGU-CRG and CGU-SFC]; 
Judiciário; Ministério Público 
[MP]; Polícia Civil; Polícia 
Federal [DPF]; Comissão 
Parlamentar de Inquérito 
[CPI]; Corregedorias; 
COAF/MF; DRCI/MJ; 
Conselho Nacional de Justiça 
[CNJ]; Conselho Nacional do 
Ministério Público [CNMP]; 
Tribunal de Contas da União 
[TCU] 
Ministério Público;  
Judiciário;  
 
Controladoria Geral da 
União [CGU-CEIS]; 
Judiciário; Ministério 
Público [MP]; COAF/MF; 
Advocacia Geral da União 
[AGU-DPP & AGU-DPI]; 
Conselho Nacional de 
Justiça [CNJ]; Conselho 
Nacional do Ministério 
Público [CNMP] 
Comitês de Ética e 
Comissão de Ética Pública 
[CEP]; Controladoria Geral 
da União [CGU-STPF]; 
COAF/MF; DRCI/MF; 
Tribunal de Contas da 
União [TCU-ISC] 
  




  Table 1 - Distribution of enforcement activities across institutions 
  Monitoring Investigation Prosecution Judgement Sanctioning Education 
Colombia 
Unidad de Información y 
Análisis Financiero [UIAF]; 
Contraloría General de la 
República; Superintendencia 
de Industria y Comercio; 
Procuraduría General de la 
República; Superintendencia 
Financiera; Auditoría 
General de la República 
Unidad de Información y 
Análisis Financiero [UIAF]; 
Contraloría General de la 
República; Poder Judicial; 
Ministério Público; Polícia 
Nacional; Policía Judicial 
Ministério Público 
Poder Judicial; 
Procuraduria General de 
la República 
Poder Judicial 
Programa Presidencial de 
Lucha Contra la 
Corrupción; Comisión 
Nacional Ciudadana de 
Lucha contra la 
Corrupción; Comisión para 




Secretaria de Prevención de 
Lavado de Dinero 
[SEPRELAD]; Contraloría 
General de la República 
Secretaría Nacional 
Anticorrupción [SENAC]; 
Secretaria de Prevención de 
Lavado de Dinero 
(SEPRELAD); Unidad de 
Delitos Económicos y Anti-
Corrupción del Ministerio 
Público; Poder Judicial; 
Ministério Público; Polícia 
Nacional 
Ministério Público Poder Judicial Poder Judicial 
Secretaría Nacional 
Anticorrupción [SENAC]; 
Sistema de Gestión de 
Ética del Poder Ejecutivo 
Nacional 
Peru  
Consejo Municipal; Consejo 
regional; Controladoria 
General de la Republica 
Procuradoria Anti-corrupcion; 
Poder Judicial [sistema anti-
corrupcion]; Fiscalias 
especializadas en corrupcion; 
Congreso de la Republica; 
Ministerio Publico; Policia 
Nacional; Consejo regional; 




especializadas en corrupcion; 
Ministerio Publico 
Poder Judicial: Sistema 
Anti-corrupcion 
Poder Judicial: Sistema 
Anti-corrupcion 
Consejo Municipal; 
Controladoria General de 
la Republica;  
 
